Faultline
Cross-Domain Strategic Infrastructure Mapping
Four datasets on orbital, nuclear, lunar governance and cyber systems, and a layer that maps where their records meet. The research question: do dependencies, escalation and governance gaps cross from one domain to another?
Four Connected Domains
Enter the Strategic Layers
Each platform maps one domain of critical infrastructure in depth. Together, they form the analytical foundation upon which Faultline reveals cross-domain dependencies and systemic risk.
Orbital
Orbital Risk Tracker
Mapping satellite constellations, orbital debris fields, and the strategic vulnerabilities of space-based infrastructure. Policy-grade interface for space security intelligence.
Nuclear
Global Nuclear Infrastructure Atlas
A geospatial atlas of global nuclear facilities, enrichment sites, reactor networks, and strategic posture across civilian and dual-use infrastructure.
Lunar Governance
Lunar Governance Tracker
Mapping authority structures in contested lunar governance. Framework analysis across all spacefaring states—who writes the rules, who interprets them, and who decides who participates.
Cyber
Cyber Escalation Atlas
Charting cyber operations, escalation dynamics, and the pathways through which digital disruption cascades into strategic consequence.
Cross-domain layer
The links, with their evidence
The cross-domain layer reads the records of all four platforms and links two records only when they are about the same thing. So far that is rare: one incident, the Viasat KA-SAT attack, is recorded in two domains (cyber and orbital), and five more cyber cases share its Sandworm intrusion set. States and infrastructure categories that several datasets include are listed as shared entities, not as links. Every link shows its basis. You can follow a record across domains, see which instruments each dataset cites, and download the snapshot.
Open the cross-domain layer- Cyber
- 33
- Orbital
- 28
- Lunar governance
- 31
- Nuclear
- 86
6 record links in snapshot v2.1.0 (2026-10-30): 1 same event, 5 same intrusion set; 25 shared entities
- Same intrusion set named in both records Same intrusion set6
- Same incident recorded in two datasets Same event1
4 fictional orbital sample records are excluded from all links and counts.
“Do orbital, nuclear, lunar governance and cyber systems fail in isolation? Faultline argues they do not, and sets four datasets side by side to see where that argument holds.”
About the Platform
What Faultline Is
Faultline is a connective research interface linking four domain-specific platforms: orbital infrastructure, nuclear infrastructure, lunar governance, and cyber escalation. It shows the four datasets side by side and asks where structural fault lines form between them.
Each platform covers one domain in depth. Faultline's cross-domain layer maps where their records name the same incident, intrusion set, state, infrastructure category or instrument. Whether dependencies accumulate, escalation crosses boundaries or governance stays fragmented at those points is the research question, not a result the layer computes.
Orbital
Space systems, satellite infrastructure, and orbital risk dynamics
Nuclear
Global nuclear infrastructure, facilities, and strategic posture
Lunar Governance
Lunar governance authority mapping, mandate analysis, and treaty framework comparison
Cyber
Cyber operations, escalation patterns, and attack surface mapping
Cross-Domain Thesis
Why Siloed Analysis Is No Longer Sufficient
Strategic risk no longer remains neatly bounded by sector. Technical dependencies, political signaling, institutional fragmentation, and infrastructural coupling allow disruption to travel across domains.
The argument: a disruption in orbital systems could degrade nuclear command-and-control, contested lunar governance frameworks may shape strategic posture, and a cyber operation against energy grids could alter nuclear calculations. If misperception in one domain can trigger escalation in another, separate maps are not enough to see it.
Does infrastructure interdependence create risk spillover?
Systems designed independently now share physical links, data pathways, and supply chains that transmit disruption across boundaries.
Does escalation travel through technical and political coupling?
The hypothesis is that a failure or attack in one domain reshapes calculations and responses in others, often through indirect and poorly understood channels.
Does governance authority concentrate through ambiguous mandates?
Competing lunar governance frameworks deploy universalist language while concentrating interpretive power, leaving cross-domain authority contested.
Are governance institutions still fragmented by sector?
Regulatory and diplomatic frameworks largely operate within domain silos, which would leave cross-domain risks under-governed.
“To understand escalation today, separate maps are not enough. Risk travels across orbital, nuclear, lunar governance, and cyber domains through pathways that no single framework can trace alone.”
Systems Convergence
Where the Fault Lines Might Run
Where orbital, nuclear, lunar governance and cyber infrastructures intersect, do strategic vulnerabilities accumulate? The diagram sketches the argument; the cross-domain layer shows what the data record.
Conceptual diagram of hypothesised risk pathways and governance fault lines; not derived from the data
Analytical Framework
Questions the Platform Asks
Cross-Domain Dependencies
Do orbital communication links, cyber networks and energy grids depend on one another closely enough that disruption in one domain degrades capacity in another? The four datasets each record one domain; the cross-domain layer maps where their records name the same incident, intrusion set, state or infrastructure category.
Escalation Transfer
Could a cyber intrusion into early-warning systems, or an anti-satellite strike on the communications that prevent escalation, push a crisis towards nuclear miscalculation? This is an argument from how the systems are coupled, not a finding from the data: the datasets have no field that records escalation passing from one domain to another.
Governance Authority Concentration
The Lunar Governance Tracker argues that the competing frameworks, the Artemis Accords and the ILRS, use universalist language while concentrating interpretive power, and it codes the discretion points in their documents where that power sits. Whether those discretion points shape strategic posture is the question it puts to the record.
Shared Pressure Points
Which nodes sit at the intersection of several domains? Undersea cables, ground stations, enrichment facilities and data centres are candidates, and single-domain analysis would miss cascading effects through them. None of the four datasets records them as shared nodes yet, so this is a question for future coding, not something the layer can show.
Sister Project
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A research platform on what AI governance misses: how AI-mediated environments may reshape the human subject.
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Creator
Risa Koyanagi
Cambridge Future Scholar. Research at the intersection of lunar governance, nuclear governance, cyber governance, strategic risk, and emerging technology governance.
risakoyanagi.com →
Sister Project
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The interactive mythic world of cultural and philosophical interfaces where memory, meaning, and selfhood can be explored.
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